Gideon Rasmussen, CISSP, CISA, CISM, CIPP, writes in his latest blog post (http://www.gideonrasmussen.com/article-22.html) about the BP Oil spill and operational risk, and the damages the spill is causing BP. Ignoring the hindsight bias of the article here… “This oil spill is a classic example of a black swan (events with the potential for severe impact [...]
These came across the SIRA mailing list. They were so good, I had to share: https://eight2late.wordpress.com/2009/07/01/cox%E2%80%99s-risk-matrix-theorem-and-its-implications-for-project-risk-management/ http://eight2late.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/visualising-content-and-context-using-issue-maps-an-example-based-on-a-discussion-of-coxs-risk-matrix-theorem/ http://eight2late.wordpress.com/2009/10/06/on-the-limitations-of-scoring-methods-for-risk-analysis/ Thanks to Kevin Riggins for finding them and pointing them out.
In comments to my “Why I Don’t Like CRISC” article, Oliver writes: CobIT allows to segregate what is called IT in analysable parts. Different Risk models apply to those parts. e.g. Information Security, Architecture, Project management. In certain areas the risk models are more mature (Infosec / Project Management) and in certain they are not [...]
PREFACE: You might interpret this blog post as being negative about risk management here, dear readers. Don’t. This isn’t a diatrabe against IRM, only why “certification” around information risk is a really, really silly idea. Apparently, my blog about why I don’t like the idea of CRISC has long-term stickiness. Just today, Philip writes in [...]
Some time back, a friend of mine said “Alex, I like the concept of Risk Management, but it’s a little like the United Nations – Good in concept, horrible in execution”. Recently, a couple of folks have been talking about how security should just be a “diligence” function, that is, we should just prove that [...]
Luther Martin, blogger with Voltage Security, has advised caution about using of risk risk management methods for information security, saying it’s “too complicated and subtle” and may lead decision-makers astray. To backup his point, he uses the example of the Two Envelopes Problem in Bayesian (subjectivist) probability, which can lead to paradoxes. Then he posed an analogous problem in information security, with the claim that probabilistic analysis would show that new security investments are unjustified. However, Luther made some mistakes in formulating the InfoSec problem and thus the lessons from Two Envelopes Problem don’t apply. Either way, a reframing into a “possible worlds” analysis resolves the paradoxes and accurately evaluates the decision alternatives for both problems. Conclusion: risk management for InfoSec is complicated and subtle, but that only means it should be done with care and with the appropriate tools, methods, and frameworks. Unsolved research problems remain, but the Two Envelopes Problem and similar are not among them.
OR TEXAS HB1830S IS SWINEFLU LEGISLATION, IT’S BEEN INFECTED BY PORK! **UPDATE: It looks like the “vendor language” around Section Six has been struck! Given Bejtlich’s recent promises, I thought we’d take a quick but pragmatic look at why risk assessments, even dumb, back-of-the-envelope assessments, might just be a beneficial thing. As you probably know, [...]