Archive for the 'presentation' Category

Pie charts are not always wrong

In a comment, Wade says “I’ll be the contrarian here and take the position that using pie charts is not always bad.” And he’s right. Pie charts are not always bad. There are times when they’re ok. As Wade says “If you have 3-4 datapoints, a pie can effectively convey what one is intending to present.” Which is true. But in every case I’ve seen, those situations are as well served with a small bar graph.

What’s the least contrived situation in which a pie chart is better than a bar graph or table? (Pac man and pies are two obvious examples.)

The Visual Display of Quantitative Information

In Verizon’s post, “A Comparison of [Verizon's] DBIR with UK breach report,” we see:

pie-charts-suck.jpg

Quick: which is larger, the grey slice on top, or the grey slice on the bottom? And ought grey be used for “sophisticated” or “moderate”?


I’m confident that both organizations are focused on accurate reporting. I am optimistic that this small example in the utlity of pie charts will inform report writers. The report writers and their graphics departments, loving their customers, will move to bar charts to help them compare numbers between sources.

I’m confident that not using pie charts is a best practice.

Elsewhere: “The only time it makes sense to use a pie chart.”

And elsewhere: “The Visual Display of Quantitative Information, 2nd edition

Miscommunicating risks to teenagers

Security programs that depend on 100% compliance are a bad idea, especially if they depend on 100% compliance from people who are proven to be poor in compliance capabilities.

Case in point:  I saw a documentary about “Abstinence only” sex education programs for teens in the public schools of New Mexico — one negative example in Albuquerque and one positive example in Socorro.   (This is federally funded.)  Skipping over the most aggregious errors and misstatements in these programs, I noticed one big blooper regarding risk estimation and risk communication.

The educators who developed and deliver this program emphasize the failure rate of condoms as argument against relying on them.  In contrast, abstinence-only is touted because it is 100% effective in preventing unplanned pregnancy and all the negative stuff that goes along with it.  Funny thing–they never mentioned the failure rate of abstinence-only when implemented by teenagers!     Sure, you can tell teenagers to be abstinent and they can even commit to it, but would you bet on it?   What odds would you demand for a large bet(say, $100,000 from your bank account) that a large group of teens would remain abstinent for five years?  There are plenty of studies (e.g. here and here) that demonstrate the limited capabilities of teens to avoid risky behavior, control impulses, rationally balance short-term gain against long-term pain, think beyond a short planning horizon, resist peer pressure, etc.    For most teens in the US, their “failure rate” (i.e. failing to avoid risky behaviors) is greater than 0%, and in cases of “multiple-risk adolescents ” the failure rate is far above 0%.

full-body condom

I would bet that condoms are much more reliable than the average teenager’s commitments to eschew immediate pleasures.   Of course, using both would be much more reliable than either alone.   This is “defense in depth”, of course.  Better still, take it to the max and advise that they add a “full-body condom”.  Then they would be “fer sher,  fer sher!”, as the Valley Girl might say. :-)

Ooops! and Ooops again!

Those of you who’ve heard me speak about the New School with slides have probably heard me refer to this as an astrolabe:

orrey.jpg

Brett Miller just emailed me and asked (as part of a very nice email) “isn’t that an orrery, not an astrolabe?”

It appears that I’m going to have to update my commentary. Thanks, Brett!

[And thanks Scott--I misspelt orrery, now corrected.]

Speaking in Michigan on Tuesday

Andrew Stewart and I will be speaking at the University of Michigan SUMIT_09 on Tuesday. We’re on 10:30-11:25. If you’re in the area, please come by.

Visualization Friday – Beautiful, Functional, and Effective

We can all learn from this great role model, aimed at personal nutrition awareness and education: Nutritiondata.com .

I encourage you to click on the images below to visit the site and explore interactive features. 

nutritiondata-dot-com1
nutritiondata-dot-com2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If only security awareness web sites aimed at end-users and consumers were this good.

Making Sense of the SANS “Top Cyber Security Risks” Report

The SANS Top Cyber Security Risks report has received a lot of positive publicity (19 online stories, at last count).  (TippingPoint and Qualys were partners in the report.) But none of the reporters or bloggers analyzed the report, the methods, or the data.  They just repeat the main points from the report. 

I applaud the effort and goals of the study and it may have some useful conclusions. We should have more of this type of study, especially at a large scale.

Unfortunately, the report has some major problems, listed roughly in order of severity:  (for details, read on…)

Continue reading ‘Making Sense of the SANS “Top Cyber Security Risks” Report’

Visualization Friday – Improving a Bad Graphic

We can learn from bad examples and how they can be corrected.  Case in point:  the newly released SANS “Top Cyber Security Risks” report .  Here’s the first graphic in the report:

SANS graphic

(I imagine that this graphic was created by a professional designer based on some simple sketch or even just notes from an expert.  I assume that the designer picked all the colors and shapes.  Pretty, isn’t it?)

 

 

 

But what does this upside-down pyramid mean, with the arrow by its side and a bar labeled “number of vulnerabilities”?   My first several interpretations turned out to be mistaken.  I thought the pyramid shape was significant, which it isn’t.  There is no meaningful horizontal axis.  I thought the colors might be significant (i.e. red = “most severe” and green=”least severe”) but that was mistaken.  I thought the bar labeled “number of vulnerabilities” was some separate quantity being represented, which it isn’t.  For a moment, I thought the arrow might signify some sort of migration or causation path.  Wrong again.  Finally, I thought the vertical size of each segment of the pyramid was significant, as if it was proportional to the number of vulnerabilities in that category.  Muy wrong-o!  The three top slices are all the same size, which suggests they are sized to allow the text to fit comfortably, not to represent any quantity.

I puzzled over this graphic for almost 15 minutes before I was confident I knew what it was trying to communicate. 

I created this alternative graphic to communicate the same message more clearly:

Alternative SANS graphic

This simple graphic expresses the essential message that “total vulnerabilities” is the sum of each of the components.  That is the whole message – nothing more.  Topologically, it’s basically a Venn diagram.  Because the individual boxes are not quite touching, there is less chance for the reader to assume that the box size (or shape) matters in any quantitative sense.  You aren’t visually adding them up in any direction, and therefore you don’t need any axis or axis label.

OK. This graphic isn’t as pretty as the one above, but at least it’s clean and the meaning is very apparent.  There’s little room for misinterpretation. 

 

 

The bigger question is why would this piece of information merit a graphic in the first place?  Wouldn’t a sentence with a bulleted list work just as well?  I think it would.  Thus, this is another case of graphics overkill.

Moral of this story:  don’t simply hand your graphics to a designer with the instructions to “make this pretty”.   Yes, the resulting graphic may be pretty, but it may lose its essential meaning or it might just be more confusing than enlightening.  Someone has to take responsibility for picking the right visualization metaphor and structures.

12 Tips for Designing an InfoSec Risk Scorecard (its harder than it looks)

A few months ago on the Securitymetrics.org mailing list, someone bravely posted their draft of an Information Security (InfoSec) Risk scorecard, asking for feedback.  I sent feedback via private email, and then forwarded it to specific people who asked for a copy.  Several of those folks, including the original poster, said I should generalize the feedback and post it some place to help anyone who is trying to design an InfoSec risk scorecard.  Here it is in the form of “12 tips”.

Why is it important to get the design right?  A risk scorecard is often the first step an organization takes toward the risk management approach to InfoSec.  If it’s done poorly, it might be their last step, too.

(For the tips, read on…)  Continue reading ‘12 Tips for Designing an InfoSec Risk Scorecard (its harder than it looks)’

Only an idea after a bunch of calculating

Andrew Koppelman has a post on lawprof blog Balkinization, titled “You have no idea:”

This data sits uneasily beside a recent study in the American Journal of Medicine of personal bankruptcies in the United States. In 2007, 62% of all personal bankruptcies were driven by medical costs. “Nationally, a quarter of firms cancel coverage immediately when an employee suffers a disabling illness; another quarter do so within a year,” the report states. Most of the medical debtors were well educated, owned homes, and had middle-class occupations, and three-quarters of them had health insurance. “Unless you’re a Warren Buffett or Bill Gates, you’re one illness away from financial ruin in this country,” lead author Steffie Woolhandler, M.D., of the Harvard Medical School, said in an interview. “If an illness is long enough and expensive enough, private insurance offers very little protection against medical bankruptcy, and that’s the major finding in our study.”

In other words, all those people who oppose health care reform because they like the coverage they’ve got really have no idea of the real dangers they face, because they have no idea what their insurance companies would really do to them if they got sick. This poses a real political challenge for the proponents of reform. The people who will most benefit from the consumer protections that Obama is advocating – those who will experience serious illness in the future – have no idea that they are benefiting, and so will not politically reward those who deliver the benefits. The Democrats could give most Americans substantially greater security and receive no reward for it.

Now, reading that, I actually still have no idea of the real danger I face. I have some understanding of what might go wrong, but no idea how likely it is. (Nor how effectively the new health care bill might address it.)

It turns out that the paper includes some very important data that the above does not: “Between January 25 and April 11, 2007, we obtained from
Automated Access to Court Electronic Records, a list of all
118,308 bankruptcy petitions filed in the US.” That’s a roughly 11 week period, and an annualized rate of 365/77*118308=560,810. Given that the new US bankruptcy law came into effect October, 2005, that wasn’t a confounding factor. Comparing that to other things that might impact our lives (from the CDC), there were 631,636 deaths from heart disease, and 559,888 (or so) deaths from cancer, and a “mere” 137,119 deaths from strokes.

I know the new bill is tremendously complex, and contains more than catastrophic insurance of last resort. Which is broken: you can’t insure the cost of managing a chronic illness once you know you have it, all you can do is spread it around. While that may be a proper function of government, it’s no longer insurance when p=1. I’d prefer to pay for routine and minor care, and buy insurance against the chance that I contract something chronic.

You may be asking “so what does all of this have to do with The New School of Information Security?” Well, it’s about presenting data in context. Koppleman’s post didn’t do as much as I think it should have to correct the problem that most people “have no idea of the real dangers they face.” If you’re explaining security issues to Bob Carr or some other exec, you can’t just present impact. You have to present context. Ideally, you’d do it without comparing apples to oranges, or bankruptcies to deaths, but I’m taking it easy this Labor Day Sunday. Asking execs to know what the right comparatives are, and either have the data at hand or to dig it out as you’re presenting is nearly a dereliction of the presenter’s duty.

Of course, in information security, we don’t have a CDC. We have the fine volunteers over at DatalossDB.

If you decide to take this post as license to debate health care reform in the comments, I’ll ask that you keep it civil and respectful.