There’s been a lot of noise of late because Oracle just released their latest round of patches and there are a total of 78 of them. There’s no doubt that that is a lot of patches. But in and of itself the number of patches is a terrible metric for how secure a product is. [...]
Filed under: metrics by David Mortman on Thursday, January 19, 2012
1 Comment »
On Friday, I watched Eric Ries talk about his new Lean Startup book, and wanted to talk about how it might relate to security. Ries concieves as startups as businesses operating under conditions of high uncertainty, which includes things you might not think of as startups. In fact, he thinks that startups are everywhere, even [...]
Filed under: argument, Doing it Differently, measurement, metrics by adam on Tuesday, September 20, 2011
No Comments »
The fine folks at Securosis are starting a blog series on “Fact-based Network Security: Metrics and the Pursuit of Prioritization“, starting in a couple of weeks. Sounds pretty New School to me! I suggest that you all check it out and participate in the dialog. Should be interesting and thought provoking. [Edit -- fixed my [...]
Filed under: Data Analysis, Doing it Differently, metrics by Russell on Wednesday, August 10, 2011
3 Comments »
My colleagues Dinei Florencio and Cormac Herley have a new paper out, “Sex, Lies and Cyber-crime Surveys.” Our assessment of the quality of cyber-crime surveys is harsh: they are so compromised and biased that no faith whatever can be placed in their findings. We are not alone in this judgement. Most research teams who have [...]
Filed under: measurement, metrics by adam on Thursday, June 23, 2011
4 Comments »
In two recent blog posts (here and here), Chris Wysopal (CTO of Veracode) proposed a metric called “Application Security Debt”. I like the general idea, but I have found some problems in his method. In this post, I suggest corrections that will be both more credible and more accurate, at least for half of the [...]
Filed under: data, Data Analysis, metrics, Science of Risk Management by Russell on Saturday, March 5, 2011
7 Comments »
Mike Rothman’s “Firestarter” on “Risk Metrics are Crap“. It’s very difficult to argue with a poorly constructed argument. Especially when I have no idea what a “risk metric” is. But best as I can tell, Mike’s position is that unless you are smart and/or have strong resources allocated to your InfoSec team, things like metrics, [...]
Filed under: measurement, metrics by alex on Tuesday, March 1, 2011
No Comments »
Symantec’s new Norton Cybercrime Index looks like it is mostly a marketing tool. They present it as though there is solid science, data, and methods behind it, but an initial analysis shows that this is probably not the case. The only way to have confidence in this is if Symantec opens up about their algorthms and data.
Filed under: data, disclosure, fail, metrics, Uncategorized, verification by Russell on Thursday, February 17, 2011
2 Comments »
Analysis of Heartland’s business as a going concern by @oneraindrop. Especially interesting after comments on the CMO video.
Filed under: Data Analysis, measurement, metrics by alex on Saturday, January 22, 2011
2 Comments »
The visual metaphor of a dashboard is a dumb idea for management-oriented information security metrics. It doesn’t fit the use cases and therefore doesn’t support effective user action based on the information. Dashboards work when the user has proportional controllers or switches that correspond to each of the ‘meters’ and the user can observe the effect of using those controllers and switches in real time by observing the ‘meters’. Dashboards don’t work when there is a loose or ambiguous connection between the information conveyed in the ‘meters’ and the actions that users might take. Other visual metaphors should work better.
Filed under: metrics, Reports and Data by Russell on Wednesday, January 12, 2011
5 Comments »
No doubt my “Why I Don’t Like CRISC” blog post has created a ton of traffic and comments. Unfortunately, I’m not a very good writer because the majority of readers miss the point. Let me try again more succinctly: Just because you can codify a standard or practice doesn’t mean that this practice is sane. [...]
Filed under: best practice, best practice, metrics, Science of Risk Management by alex on Sunday, January 2, 2011
4 Comments »