Symantec’s new Norton Cybercrime Index looks like it is mostly a marketing tool. They present it as though there is solid science, data, and methods behind it, but an initial analysis shows that this is probably not the case. The only way to have confidence in this is if Symantec opens up about their algorthms and data.
Filed under: data, disclosure, fail, metrics, Uncategorized, verification by Russell on Thursday, February 17, 2011
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In the comments to “Why I Don’t Like CRISC” where I challenge ISACA to show us in valid scale and in publicly available models, the risk reduction of COBIT adoption, reader Sid starts to get it, but then kinda devolves into a defense of COBIT or something. But it’s a great comment, and I wanted [...]
Filed under: careers, fail, government, measurement, metrics, Science of Risk Management by alex on Monday, October 25, 2010
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Where there’s smoke, there’s fire, goes the adage. And in the case of an allegedly-theoretical exploit outlined in a new paper by Chris Soghoian and Sid Stamm (the compelled certificate creation attack), the presence of a product whose only use it to exploit it probably indicates that there’s more going on than one would like [...]
Filed under: disclosure, fail, privacy by Chandler on Thursday, March 25, 2010
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The Guardian has reported the first official incident of misuse of full-body scanner information The police have issued a warning for harassment against an airport worker after he allegedly took a photo of a female colleague as she went through a full-body scanner at Heathrow airport. The incident, which occurred at terminal 5 on 10 [...]
Filed under: fail, privacy by Chandler on Wednesday, March 24, 2010
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