Archive for the “fail” category

PCI & the 166816 password

by adam on June 22, 2015

This was a story back around RSA, but I missed it until RSnake brought it up on Twitter: “[A default password] can hack nearly every credit card machine in the country.” The simple version is that Charles Henderson of Trustwave (…)

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The Worst User Experience In Computer Security?

by adam on January 16, 2014

I’d like to nominate Xfinity’s “walled garden” for the worst user experience in computer security. For those not familiar, Xfinity has a “feature” called “Constant Guard” in which they monitor your internet for (I believe) DNS and IP connections for (…)

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Security Lessons From Star Wars: Breach Response

by adam on May 4, 2013

To celebrate Star Wars Day, I want to talk about the central information security failure that drives Episode IV: the theft of the plans. First, we’re talking about really persistent threats. Not like this persistence, but the “many Bothans died (…)

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Email Security Myths

by adam on November 17, 2012

My buddy Curt Hopkins is writing about the Patraeus case, and asked: I wonder, in addition to ‘it’s safe if it’s in the draft folder,’ how many additional technically- and legally-useless bits of sympathetic magic that people regularly use in (…)

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Base Rate & Infosec

by adam on September 25, 2012

At SOURCE Seattle, I had the pleasure of seeing Jeff Lowder and Patrick Florer present on “The Base Rate Fallacy.” The talk was excellent, lining up the idea of the base rate fallacy, how and why it matters to infosec. (…)

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Theme breakage, help?

by adam on September 8, 2012

The blog header image is repeating because of something in the stylesheets. I can’t see where the bug is. If someone can help out, I’d be much obliged. Expanded to add: It appears that there’s a computed “repeat” on the (…)

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The Plural of Anecdote is Anecdotes

by adam on August 23, 2012

Over at Lexology.com, there’s a story which starts: Medical-data blackmail is becoming more common as more health care providers adopt electronic health records systems and store patient data digitally. (“Hackers demand ransom to keep medical records private“) The trouble with (…)

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Is Norton Cybercrime Index just ‘Security Metrics Theater’?

by Russell on February 17, 2011

Symantec’s new Norton Cybercrime Index looks like it is mostly a marketing tool. They present it as though there is solid science, data, and methods behind it, but an initial analysis shows that this is probably not the case. The only way to have confidence in this is if Symantec opens up about their algorthms and data.

A Letter from Sid CRISC – ious

by alex on October 25, 2010

In the comments to “Why I Don’t Like CRISC” where I challenge ISACA to show us in valid scale and in publicly available models, the risk reduction of COBIT adoption, reader Sid starts to get it, but then kinda devolves (…)

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Smoke, Fire and SSL

by Chandler on March 25, 2010

Where there’s smoke, there’s fire, goes the adage. And in the case of an allegedly-theoretical exploit outlined in a new paper by Chris Soghoian and Sid Stamm (the compelled certificate creation attack), the presence of a product whose only use (…)

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