This event will be the first discussion of these Federal cybersecurity R&D objectives and will provide insights into the priorities that are shaping the direction of Federal research activities. One of the three themes is “Cyber economic incentives — foundations for cyber security markets, to establish meaningful metrics, and to promote economically sound secure practices.”
I will be entering the PhD program in Computational Social Science (with certificates in InfoSec and Economic Systems Design) at George Mason University, Fairfax VA, starting in the Fall of 2010.
Industry ‘experts’ misfired when they criticized Microsoft’s Scott Chareney’s “Internet Security Tax” idea. Q: How many of these ‘experts’ know any thing about information economics and public policy responses to negative externalities? A: Zero. Thus, they aren’t really qualified to comment. This is just one small case in the on-going public policy discussions regarding economics of information security, but given the reaction of the ‘experts’, this was a step backward.
A Gartner blog post points out the lack of data reported by vendors or customers regarding the false positive rates for anti-spam solutions. This is part of a general problem in the security industry that is a major obstical to rational analysis of effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, risk, and the rest
There has been a disconnect between the primary research sectors and a lack of appropriate funding in each is leading to decreased technological progress, exposing a huge gap in security that is happily being exploited by cybercriminals. No one seems to be able to mobilize any signficant research into breakthrough cyber security solutions. It’s been very frustrating to see so much talk and so little action. This post proposes one possible solution: Information Security Pioneers Fellowship Program (ISPFP), similar to Gene Spafford’s proposal for a Information Security and Privacy Extended Grant (ISPEG) for academic researchers.
The New School approach to information security promotes the idea that we can make better security decisions if we can measure the effectiveness of alternatives. Critics argue that so much of information security is unmeasurable, especially factors that shape risk, that quantitative approaches are futile. In my opinion, that is just a critique of our current methods [...]
There is no better illustration of the institutional and social taboos surrounding data breach reporting and information security in general than the Google-Adobe-China affair. While the Big Thinkers at the World Economic Forum discussed every other idea under the sun, this one was taboo.
A vivid image of Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt (FUD), from an email promotion by NetWitness.
To improve threat intelligence, it’s most important to address the flaws in how we interpret and use the intelligence that we already gather. Intelligence analysts are human beings, and many of their failures follow from intuitive ways of thinking that, while allowing the human mind to cut through reams of confusing information, often end up misleading us.
“Meta-taboo”: The topic itself is not taboo, but any discussion about how to actually get there or deal with the topic is taboo.