Author Archive for adam

Everybody Should Be Doing Something about InfoSec Research

Previously, Russell wrote “Everybody complains about lack of information security research, but nobody does anything about it.”

In that post, he argues for a model where

Ideally, this program should be “idea capitalists”, knowing some people and ideas won’t payoff but others will be huge winners. One thing for sure — we shouldn’t focus this program only on people who have been “officially” annointed by some hierarchy, some certification program, or by credentials alone.

I agree that a focus on those anointed won’t help, but that doesn’t mean it’s easy to set up such an institution.

The trouble with the approach is that we have such institutions (*ARPA, venture capital) and they’ve all failed for institutional reasons. However high their aspirations, such organizations over time get flack from their funders over their failures, their bizarre and newsworthy ideas and the organizations become conservative. They trend towards “proven entrepreneurs” and incrementalism. The “Pioneer Fellows” idea does not overcome this structural issue. (There is an argument that the MacArthur genius grants overcome it. I’m not aware of any research into the relative importance of work done before and after such grants, but I have my suspicions, prejudices and best practices.)

Of course, I might be wrong. If you have a spare million bucks, please set this up, and we can see how it goes. An experiment, if you will.

Experiments are a big part of why Andrew and I focused on free availability of data. With data, those with ideas can test them. There will be a scrum of entrepreneurial types analyzing the data. Fascinating stuff will emerge from that chaos. With evidence, they will go to the extant ‘big return’ organizations and get funding. Or they’ll work for big companies and shift product directions.

That is, the issue in infosec is not a lack of interesting ideas, it’s the trouble in testing them without data. We need data to test ideas and figure out how they impact outcomes.

Krebs on Cyber vs Physical Crooks

In addition, while traditional bank robbers are limited to the amount of money they can physically carry from the scene of the crime, cyber thieves have a seemingly limitless supply of accomplices to help them haul the loot, by hiring so-called money mules to carry the cash for them.

I can’t help but notice one other important distinction between these two types of bank crimes: The federal government sure publishes a lot more information about physical bank robberies that it makes available about online stick-ups.

Go read “Cyber Crooks Leave Traditional Bank Robbers in the Dust” by Brian Krebs. Then ask why we sweep these crimes under the rug.

Elevation of Privilege: The Threat Modeling Game

In my work blog: “Announcing Elevation of Privilege: The Threat Modeling Game.”

After RSA, I’ll have more to say about how it came about, how it helps you and how very new school it is. But if you’re here, you should come get a deck at the Microsoft booth (1500 row).

Adam signing today at RSA

I’ll be in the RSA bookstore today at noon, signing books. Please drop on by.

PS: I’m now signing Kindles, too.

Howard Schmidt’s talk at RSA

The New York Times has a short article by Markoff, “U.S. to Reveal Rules on Internet Security.” The article focuses first on declassification, and goes on to say:

In his first public speaking engagement at the RSA Conference, which is scheduled to open Tuesday, Mr. Schmidt said he would focus on two themes: partnerships and transparency.

I’m very happy that in a little under two years since we published the New School, transparency has taken a role on center stage. Obviously, I wouldn’t claim all the credit for that. At the same time, I’m happy that we’ve contributed to re-orienting people and accelerating this important change.

The Economist on Breach Disclosure

In “New rules for big data,” the Economist seems to advocate for more disclosure of security problems:

The benefits of information security—protecting computer systems and networks—are inherently invisible: if threats have been averted, things work as normal. That means it often gets neglected. One way to deal with that is to disclose more information. A pioneering law in California in 2003 required companies to notify people if a security breach had compromised their personal information, which pushed companies to invest more in prevention. The model has been adopted in other states and could be used more widely.

In addition, regulators could require large companies to undergo an annual information-security audit by an accredited third party, similar to financial audits for listed companies. Information about vulnerabilities would be kept confidential, but it could be used by firms to improve their practices and handed to regulators if problems arose. It could even be a requirement for insurance coverage, allowing a market for information security to emerge.

I think it’s cool. You don’t. Discuss.

Pie charts are not always wrong

In a comment, Wade says “I’ll be the contrarian here and take the position that using pie charts is not always bad.” And he’s right. Pie charts are not always bad. There are times when they’re ok. As Wade says “If you have 3-4 datapoints, a pie can effectively convey what one is intending to present.” Which is true. But in every case I’ve seen, those situations are as well served with a small bar graph.

What’s the least contrived situation in which a pie chart is better than a bar graph or table? (Pac man and pies are two obvious examples.)

The Visual Display of Quantitative Information

In Verizon’s post, “A Comparison of [Verizon's] DBIR with UK breach report,” we see:

pie-charts-suck.jpg

Quick: which is larger, the grey slice on top, or the grey slice on the bottom? And ought grey be used for “sophisticated” or “moderate”?


I’m confident that both organizations are focused on accurate reporting. I am optimistic that this small example in the utlity of pie charts will inform report writers. The report writers and their graphics departments, loving their customers, will move to bar charts to help them compare numbers between sources.

I’m confident that not using pie charts is a best practice.

Elsewhere: “The only time it makes sense to use a pie chart.”

And elsewhere: “The Visual Display of Quantitative Information, 2nd edition

Adam & Andy Jaquith: A conversation

In December, Andy Jaquith and I had a fun conversation about info security with Bill Brenner listening in. The transcript is at “Meeting of the Minds,” and the audio is here.

Open Security Foundation Looking for Advisors

Open Security Foundation – Advisory Board – Call for Nominations:

The Open Security Foundation (OSF) is an internationally recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit public organization seeking senior leaders capable of providing broad-based perspective on information security, business management and fundraising to volunteer for an Advisory Board. The Advisory Board will provide insight and guidance when developing future plans, an open forum for reviewing community feedback and a broader view when prioritizing potential new services.

I figure readers of this blog should be interested in helping drive open data sources.