Secure Development or Backdoors: Pick One

by adam on October 4, 2016

In “Threat Modeling Crypto Back Doors,” I wrote:

In the same vein, the requests and implementations for such back-doors may be confidential or classified. If that’s the case, the features may not go through normal tracking for implementation, testing, or review, again reducing the odds that they are secure. Of course, because such a system is designed to bypass other security controls, any weaknesses are likely to have outsized impact.

It sounds like exactly what I predicted has occurred. As Joseph Menn reports in “Yahoo secretly scanned customer emails for U.S. intelligence:”

When Stamos found out that Mayer had authorized the program, he resigned as chief information security officer and told his subordinates that he had been left out of a decision that hurt users’ security, the sources said. Due to a programming flaw, he told them hackers could have accessed the stored emails.

(I should add that I did not see anything like this at Microsoft, but had thought about how it might have unfolded as I wrote what I wrote in the book excerpt above.)

Crypto back doors are a bad idea, and we cannot implement them without breaking the security of the internet.

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