by adam on July 19, 2012
Yesterday, Dave Aitel wrote a fascinating article “Why you shouldn’t train employees for security awareness,” arguing that money spent on training employees about awareness is wasted.
While I don’t agree with everything he wrote, I submit that your opinion on this (and mine) are irrelevant. The key question is “Is money spent on security awareness a good way to spend your security budget?”
The key is we have data now. As someone comments:
[Y]ou somewhat missed the point of the phishing awareness program. I do agree that annual training is good at communicating policy – but horrible at raising a persistent level of awareness. Over the last 5 years, our studies have shown that annual IA training does very little to improve the awareness of users against social engineering based attacks (you got that one right). However we have shown a significant improvement in awareness as a result of running the phishing exercises (Carronade). These exercises sent fake phishing emails to our cadet population every few weeks (depends on the study). We demonstrated a very consistent reduction to an under 5% “failure” after two iterations. This impact is short lived though. After a couple months of not running the study, the results creep back up to 40% failure.
So, is a reduction in phishing failure to under 5% a good investment? Are there other investments that bring your failure rates lower?
If someone (say, GAO) obtains data on US Government department training programs, and cross-correlates that with incidents being reported to US-CERT, then we can assess the efficacy of those training programs
Opinions, including mine, Dave’s, and yours, just ain’t relevant in the face of data. We can answer well-framed questions of “which of these programs best improves security” and “is that improvement superior to other investments?”
The truth, in this instance, won’t set us free. Dave Mortman pointed out that a number of regulations may require awareness training as a best practice. But if we get data, we can, if needed, address the regulations.
If you’re outraged by Dave’s claims, prove him wrong. If you’re outraged by the need to spend money on social engineering, prove it’s a waste.
Put the energy to better use than flaming over a hypothesis.