by adam on March 21, 2011
After spending a while crowing about the ChoicePoint breach, I decided that laughing about breaches doesn’t help us as much as analyzing them. In the wake of RSA’s recent breach, we should give them time to figure out what happened, and look forward to them fulfilling their commitment to share their experiences.
Right now we don’t know a lot, and this pair of sentences is getting a lot of attention:
Some of that information is specifically related to RSA’s SecurID two-factor authentication products. While at this time we are confident that the information extracted does not enable a successful direct attack on any of our RSA SecurID customers, this information could potentially be used to reduce the effectiveness of a current two-factor authentication implementation as part of a broader attack.
With the exception of RSA and its employees, I may be one of the best positioned people to talk about their protocols, because a long time ago, I reverse engineered their system. And when I did, I discovered that “The protocol used by Security Dynamics has substantial flaws which appear to be exploitable and reduce the security of a system using Security Dynamics software to that of a username and password.” It’s important to note that that’s from a 1996 paper, and the flaws I discovered have been corrected.
I’ve been trying to keep up with the actual facts revealed, and I’ve read a lot of analysis on what happened. In particular, Steve Bellovin’s technical analysis is quite good, and I’d like to add a little nuance and color. Bellovin writes: “Is the risk that the attackers have now learned H? If that’s a problem, H was a bad choice to start with.” In conversations after I wrote my 1996 paper, it was clear to me that John Brainard and his engineering colleagues knew that. (Their marketing department felt differently.) RSA has lots of cryptographers who still know it.
The nuance I’d like to point out is that many prominent cryptographers had reviewed their system before I noticed the key management error. So it’s possible that that lesson leads to the statement that the information could be used. That is, the crypto or implementation, however aware of Kerkhoffs’ Principle, could still contain flaws.
If someone had compromised the database of secrets that enable synchronization, then that would “enable a successful direct attack on” one or more customers. So speculation that that’s the compromise cannot be correct without the CEO of a publicly traded company lying in statements submitted to the SEC. That seems unlikely.
But there’s another layer of nuance, which we can see if we read the advice RSA has given their customers. When I read that list, it becomes apparent that the APT used a variety of social engineering attacks. So it’s possible that amongst what was stolen was a database of contacts who run SecurId deployments. That knowledge “could potentially be used to reduce the effectiveness of a current two-factor authentication implementation as part of a broader attack”
My opinion is that social engineers using the contacts database in some way is more likely than a cryptanalytic attack, and a cryptanalytic attack is more likely than a compromise of a secrets database. But we don’t know. Speculating like mad isn’t helping. Maybe I shouldn’t even post this, but the leaps of logic out there provoke some skeptical thinking.
[update: some great comments coming in, don't skip them.]
[Update 2: Between Nicko's comment on the new letter, and Paul Kocher's analysis in his Threatpost podcast I'm not sure that this analysis is still valid.]