by adam on January 13, 2017
There are two great blog posts at Securosis to kick off the new year:
- Tidal Forces: The Trends Tearing Apart Security As We Know It (Rich Mogull)
- Network Security in the Cloud Age: Everything Changes (Mike Rothman)
Both are deep and important and worth pondering. I want to riff on something that Rich said:
On the security professional side I have trained hundreds of practitioners on cloud security, while working with dozens of organizations to secure cloud deployments. It can take years to fully update skills, and even longer to re-engineer enterprise operations, even without battling internal friction from large chunks of the workforce…
It’s worse than that.
Yesterday Recently on Emergent Chaos, I talked about Red Queen Races, where you have to work harder and harder just to keep up.
In the pre-cloud world, you could fully update your skills. You could be an expert on Active Directory 2003, or Checkpoint’s Firewall-1. You could generate friction over moving to AD2012. You no longer have that luxury. Just this morning, Amazon launched a new rev of something. Google is pushing a new rev of its G-Suite to 5% of customers. Your skillset with the prior release is now out of date. (I have no idea if either really did this, but they could have.) Your skillset can no longer be a locked-in set of skills and knowledge. You need the meta-skills of modeling and learning. You need to understand what your model of AWS is, and you need to allocate time and energy to consciously learning about it.
That’s not just a change for individuals. It’s a change for how organizations plan for training, and it’s a change for how we should design training, as people will need lots more “what’s new in AWS in Q1 2017” training to augment “intro to AWS.”
Tidal forces, indeed.
by adam on December 15, 2016
[Dec 20 update: The first draft of this post ended up with both consumer and enterprise advice, which made it complex. The enterprise half is now on the IANS blog: Never Waste a Good Crisis: Yahoo Edition.]
The statement says that for “potentially affected accounts, the stolen user account information may have included names, email addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, hashed passwords (using MD5) and, in some cases, encrypted or unencrypted security questions and answers.”
Yahoo says users should change their passwords and security questions and answers for any other accounts on which they used the same or similar information used for their Yahoo account.
The New York Times has an article “How Many Times Has Your Personal Information Been Exposed to Hackers?”
The big question is “How can you protect yourself in the future?” The Times is right to ask it, and their answer starts:
It’s pretty simple: You can’t. But you can take a few steps to make things harder for criminals. Turn on two-factor authentication, whenever possible. Most banking sites and ones like Google, Apple, Twitter and Facebook offer two-factor authentication. Change your passwords frequently and do not use the same password across websites.
I think the Times makes two important “mistakes” in this answer. [Update: I think mistake may be harsher than I mean: I wish they’d done differently.]
The first mistake is to not recommend a password manager. Using a password manager is essential to using a different password on each website. I use 1Password, and recommend it. I also use it to generate random answers to “security questions” and use 1Password’s label/data fields to store those. I do hope that one day they start managing secret questions, but understand that that’s tricky because secret questions are not submitted to the web with standard HTML form names.
The reason I recommend 1Password is that it works well without the cloud, and that means that a cloud provider cannot disclose my passwords. They also can’t disclose my encrypted passwords, where encrypting them is a mitigation for that first-layer information disclosure threat. (One of these days I should write up my complete password manager threat model.) These threats are important and concrete. 1Password competitor Lastpass has repeatedly messed this up, and those problems are made worse by their design of mandatory centralization.
It’s not to say that 1Password is perfect. Tavis Ormandy has said “More password manager bugs out today and more due out soon. I’m not going to look at more, the whole industry is crazy,” and commented on 1Password with a GIF. Some of those issues have now been revealed. (Tavis is very, very good at finding security flaws, and this worries me a bit.)
But: authentication is hard. You must make a risk tradeoff. The way I think about the risk tradeoff is:
- If I use a single password, it’s easily compromised in many places. (Information disclosure threats at each site, and in my browser.)
- If I use a paper list, an attacker who compromises my browser can likely steal most of my passwords.
- If I use a paper list, I can’t back it up easily. (My backups are on my phone, and in a PGP encrypted file on a cloud provider.)
So 1Password is the least bad of currently available options, and the Times should have put a stake in the ground on the subject. (Or perhaps their new “Wirecutter” division should take a look. Oh wait! They did. I disagree with their assessment, as stated above.)
The second big mistake is to assert that you can’t fully protect yourself in a simple, declarative sentence at the end of their answer. What’s that you say? It’s not the end of their answer? But it is. In today’s short attention-span world, you see those words and stop. You move on. It’s important that security advice be actionable.
So: use a password manager. Lie in your answers to “secret questions.” Tell different sites different lies. Use a password manager to remember them.
by adam on December 12, 2016
This quote from Bob Iger, head of Disney, is quite interesting for his perspective as a leader of a big company:
There is a human side to it that I try to apply and consider. [But] the harder thing is to balance with the reality that not everything is perfect. In the normal course of running a company this big, you’re going to see, every day, things that are not as great as you would have hoped or wanted them to be. You have to figure out how to absorb that without losing your sense of optimism, which is part of leadership — without losing faith, without wanting to go under the covers and not come out, without being down or angry to a counterproductive level, and without demanding something of people that is unfair, inhuman, impossible. (“Bob Iger on Shanghai Disney, Parting With His Chosen Successor, and His Pursuit of Perfection“, Variety)
Note that he’s not saying ignore the problems; he’s not saying don’t get angry; he’s not saying don’t demand improvement. He’s saying don’t get so angry that it’s counterproductive. He’s saying be demanding, but be demanding in a fair way. He’s also saying that you can remain optimistic in the face of problems.
There’s lessons here for security professionals.
by adam on December 8, 2016
There’s a new paper from Mark Thompson and Hassan Takabi of the University of North Texas. The title captures the question:
Effectiveness Of Using Card Games To Teach Threat Modeling For Secure Web Application Developments
Gamification of classroom assignments and online tools has grown significantly in recent years. There have been a number of card games designed for teaching various cybersecurity concepts. However, effectiveness of these card games is unknown for the most part and there is no study on evaluating their effectiveness. In this paper, we evaluate effectiveness of one such game, namely the OWASP Cornucopia card game which is designed to assist software development teams identify security requirements in Agile, conventional and formal development
processes. We performed an experiment where sections of graduate students and undergraduate students in a security related course at our university were split into two groups, one of which played the Cornucopia card game, and one of which did not. Quizzes were administered both before and after the activity, and a survey was taken to measure student attitudes toward the exercise. The results show that while students found the activity useful and would like to see this activity and more similar exercises integrated into the classroom, the game was not easy to understand. We need to spend enough time to familiarize the students with the game and prepare them for the exercises using the game to get the best results.
I’m very glad to see games like Cornucopia evaluated. If we’re going to push the use of Cornucopia (or Elevation of Privilege) for teaching, then we ought to be thinking about how well they work in comparison to other techniques. We have anecdotes, but to improve, we must test and measure.
by adam on December 2, 2016
Over the decade or so since The New School book came out, there’s been a sea change in how we talk about breaches, and how we talk about those who got breached. We agree that understanding what’s going wrong should be a bigger part of how we learn. I’m pleased to have played some part in that movement.
As I consider where we are today, a question that we can’t answer sufficiently is “what’s in it for me?” “Why should I spend time on this?” The benefits may take too long to appear. And so we should ask what we could do about that. In that context, I am very excited to see a proposal from Rob Knake on “Creating a Federally Sponsored Cyber Insurance Program.”
He suggests that a full root cause analysis would be a condition of Federal insurance backstop:
The federally backstopped cyber insurance program should mandate that companies allow full breach investigations, which include on-site gathering of data on why the attack succeeded, to help other companies prevent similar attacks. This function would be similar to that performed by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) for aviation incidents. When an incident occurs, the NTSB establishes the facts of the incident and makes recommendations to prevent similar incidents from occurring. Although regulators typically establish new requirements upon the basis of NTSB recommendations, most air carriers implement recommendations on a voluntary basis. Such a virtuous cycle could happen in cybersecurity if companies covered by a federal cyber insurance program had their incidents investigated by a new NTSB-like entity, which could be run by the private sector and funded by insurance companies.
by adam on November 30, 2016
There’s a really interesting podcast with Robert Hurlbut
Chris Romeo and Tony UcedaVelez on the PASTA approach to threat modeling. The whole podcast is interesting, especially hearing Chris and Tony discuss how an organization went from STRIDE to CAPEC and back again.
There’s a section where they discuss the idea of “think like an attacker,” and Chris brings up some of what I’ve written (“‘Think Like an Attacker’ is an opt-in mistake.”) I think that both Chris and Tony make excellent points, and I want to add some nuance around the frame. I don’t think the opposite of “think like an attacker” is “use a checklist,” I think it’s “reason by analogy to find threats” or “use a structured approach to finding threats.” Reasoning by analogy is, admittedly, hard for a variety of reasons, which I’ll leave aside for now. But reasoning by analogy requires that you have a group of abstracted threats, and that you consider ‘how does this threat apply to my system?’ You can use a structured approach such as STRIDE or CAPEC or an attack tree, or even an unstructured, unbounded set of threats (we call this brainstorming.) That differs from good checklists in that the items in a good checklist have clear yes or no answers. For more on my perspective on checklists, take a look at my review of Gawande’s Checklist Manifesto.
by adam on November 7, 2016
One of the themes of The New School of Information Security is how other fields learn from their experiences, and how information security’s culture of hiding our incidents prevents us from learning.
Today I found yet another field where they are looking to learn from previous incidents and mistakes: zombies. From “The Zombie Survival Guide: Recorded Attacks:”
Organize before they rise!
Scripted by the world’s leading zombie authority, Max Brooks, Recorded Attacks reveals how other eras and cultures have dealt with–and survived– the ancient viral plague. By immersing ourselves in past horror we may yet prevail over the coming outbreak in our time.
Of course, we don’t need to imagine learning from our mistakes. Plenty of fields do it, and so don’t shamble around like zombies.
by adam on October 12, 2016
Much of what Andrew and I wrote about in the New School has come to pass. Disclosing breaches is no longer as scary, nor as shocking, as it was. But one thing we expected to happen was the emergence of a robust market of services for breach victims. That’s not happened, and I’ve been thinking about why that is, and what we might do about it.
I submitted a short (1 1/2 page) comment for the FTC’s PrivacyCon, and the FTC has published that here.
[Update Oct 19: I wrote a blog post for IANS, “After the Breach: Making Your Response Count“]
[Update Nov 21: the folks at Abine decided to run a survey, and asked 500 people what they’d like to see a breach notice letter. Their blog post.]
by adam on October 4, 2016
In “Threat Modeling Crypto Back Doors,” I wrote:
In the same vein, the requests and implementations for such back-doors may be confidential or classified. If that’s the case, the features may not go through normal tracking for implementation, testing, or review, again reducing the odds that they are secure. Of course, because such a system is designed to bypass other security controls, any weaknesses are likely to have outsized impact.
It sounds like exactly what I predicted has occurred. As Joseph Menn reports in “Yahoo secretly scanned customer emails for U.S. intelligence:”
When Stamos found out that Mayer had authorized the program, he resigned as chief information security officer and told his subordinates that he had been left out of a decision that hurt users’ security, the sources said. Due to a programming flaw, he told them hackers could have accessed the stored emails.
(I should add that I did not see anything like this at Microsoft, but had thought about how it might have unfolded as I wrote what I wrote in the book excerpt above.)
Crypto back doors are a bad idea, and we cannot implement them without breaking the security of the internet.
by adam on September 20, 2016
There is a frequent claim that stock markets are somehow irrational and unable to properly value the impact of cyber incidents in pricing. (That’s not usually precisely how people phrase it. I like this chart of one of the largest credit card breaches in history:
It provides useful context as we consider this quote:
On the other hand, frequent disclosure of insignificant cyberincidents could overwhelm investors and harm a company’s stock price, said Eric Cernak, cyberpractice leader at the U.S. division of German insurer Munich Re. “If every time there’s unauthorized access, you’re filing that with the SEC, there’s going to be a lot of noise,” he said.
(Corporate Judgment Call: When to Disclose You’ve Been Hacked, Tatyana Shumsky, WSJ)
Now, perhaps Mr. Cernak’s words been taken out of context. After all, it’s a single sentence in a long article, and the lead-in, which is a paraphrase, may confuse the issue.
I am surprised that an insurer would be opposed to having more data from which they can try to tease out causative factors.
Image from The Langner group. I do wish it showed the S&P 500.